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he nation's labor and physical 
resources are its primary inputs into the 
production process that is the U.S. 
economy. While we do an excellent job 
of measuring and reporting on the level 
and utilization of the nation's physical 
capital, comparable information on the 
productive contributions of the nation's 
workers is far less adequate. Measures of 
this human capital rest on count statistics, 
such as the number of people who are 
available to work and the number of 
available workers who are employed. 
While these statistics are quite useful and 
significant in their own right, they convey 
little regarding the value of the potential 
or actual contributions of these people to 
the nation's output.
Our study attempts to supplement 
existing measures of the nation's human 
capital and the extent to which that capital 
is utilized. We think of the nation's human 
capital as the value of the labor resources 
that are embodied in its working-age 
citizens. These resources can be allocated 
in many ways to produce things of value.
Indeed, it is the value of this 'output' that 
gives value to these labor resources.
In our study, we develop an indicator 
of the value of the human capital stock 
held by the nation's working-age 
population. We call this indicator 
earnings capacity (EC). We use it to study 
the time trends (from 1975 to 2000) in 
aggregate human capital in the United 
States, and also human capital per worker. 
We also use EC to evaluate the utilization 
of the nation's human capital stock. We 
explore these patterns for the entire 
working-age population, as well as for 
subgroups distinguished by race, 
schooling, and age. Thus, our empirical 
results provide insight into the 
performance of the U.S. economy over 
the past three decades, and serve to 
supplement other analyses of this 
performance.
How is EC an indicator of the nation's 
human capital stock? A comprehensive 
measure of the value of human capital of 
the nation's potential workers would be 
the value as of today of the entire future 
stream of productive services of the 
existing working-age population. This 
measure of the human capital stock is 
analogous to estimates of the nation's 
physical capital stock. If we had an 
estimate of this capital value, so defined,
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for each working-age individual, we 
could sum these values and obtain a 
measure of the nation's human capital 
stock. Some researchers have attempted 
such a measure, although it is difficult to 
produce on a timely basis (see, for 
example, Jorgenson and Fraumeni 1989).
Our EC indicator of human capital is 
not such a full "discounted present value" 
measure. Rather, EC is equal to the 
annual value of the potential output of the 
nation's working-age population. Hence, 
it reflects the market value of the annual 
earnings that the working-age population 
would generate if its human capital were 
used to its full potential, which we take to 
mean full-time, full-year work. This EC 
measure accurately tracks changes over 
time in a full human capital stock 
measure, though as an annual value its 
absolute level is much lower. By 
comparing the actual earnings of 
working-age people in the United States 
with this potential value, we are able to 
measure the extent to which human 
capital is utilized.
Like measures of the nation's physical 
capital stock, this EC human capital 
measure relies on evidence regarding how 
the market values the flow of human 
capital services. While the standard and 
regularly reported indicators of labor 
market performance measure either the 
physical quantity of potential and actual 
labor services (e.g., the labor force, 
employment, unemployment, hours 
worked) or the price of labor services 
(e.g., wage rates), EC captures in one 
indicator both the level of potential labor 
supply, and the valuation of these 
services. For many questions, then, the 
EC measure is able to provide a richer and 
more comprehensive description of the 
actual and potential performance of the 
labor market.
Per Capita Earnings Capacity, 
1975-2000
Figure 1 presents our human capital 
indicator for the entire working-age 
population, and for men and women 
separately, in per capita terms for the 
1975-2000 period. During that period, 
average real EC increased from $31,500 to 
$39,100 (in 2000 dollars), or about 24 
percent. For men, per capita real EC
increased by only 16 percent, from 
$40,100 to $46,500. After fluctuating over 
the period from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s, average male EC has grown 
steadily since then, and this recent growth 
has accounted for the entire $6,000 
increase in average male EC over the 25- 
year period. In contrast, per capita female 
human capital increased over the period 
from $23,600 to $30,100, or by 36 
percent. Growth in average female EC 
was persistent over the entire 25 years, 
sagging only slightly during both of the 
recession periods. This gender disparity in 
the growth of EC is clearly seen in the 
convergence of the two time trends over 
the period.
The Utilization of Human Capital
We measure the extent of human 
capital utilization using a capacity 
utilization rate (CUR), the ratio of 
aggregate earnings for the working-age 
population to that population's aggregate 
EC. Figure 2 shows the capacity 
utilization rate of the entire working-age 
population, and for working-age men and 
women. The trend in the overall CUR is 
erratic, reflecting both changes in wage 
rates, and changes in labor force 
participation and working-time patterns. 
The effect of the early 1980s recession is 
seen in the drop in the overall CUR from 
over 63 percent in 1979 to 60 percent in 
1982. Similarly, the CUR dipped slightly 
in the early 1990s from 67 percent in
1989 to 65 percent in 1992 reflecting 
the recession in that period. The CUR 
increased substantially during the period 
of prosperity following that recession. 
Indeed, over the entire period after 1995, 
CUR was at least 70 percent, a level that 
had not been attained during the prior two 
decades.
The CUR of working-age males is 
substantially higher than the overall CUR. 
It began the period at 75 percent, and 
fluctuated between 70 and 75 percent 
until the early 1990s. After 1993, a surge 
in utilization occurred, raising the male 
CUR to 79 percent by 1996 and 
ultimately to 81 percent in 2000. This 
value exceeded by six percentage points 
its highest level recorded during the 
1975-1990 period. The CUR pattern for 
women of working age is quite different 
from that of men. At the beginning of the 
period, female human capital utilization 
stood at 41 percent of its potential. From 
that low level, female CUR began a rise 
that persists until the present. The 
recessions in the early 1980s and early 
1990s are barely reflected in the series for 
women. Over the entire 25-year period, 
the female CUR rose by a remarkable 20 
percentage points, or by 50 percent.
The Sources of Foregone Potential 
Earnings
An interesting question concerns how 
individuals use those hours that are not 
spent in market work. We call the value of
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Figure 2 Capacity Utilization Rates, by Sex, 1975-2000
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those hours unrealized potential earnings 
(UPE), reflecting the idea that they 
represent the human capital that does not 
pass through the market, and in that sense, 
goes unutilized. From respondents' 
answers to questions regarding why they 
work less than the full-time, full-year 
norm, UPE for each year can be 
decomposed into the following 
comprehensive set of "reasons": work is 
not available (unemployed); illness/ 
disability; retirement; voluntary part-time 
work; housework, including child care; 
and other.
The bulk of unutilized EC for the 
working-age population stems from the 
hours spent in housework. In 1975, more 
than 50 percent of unutilized EC was 
attributable to the decision (primarily of 
women) to engage in household activities 
rather than market work. The housework 
share of UPE falls substantially over the 
period. By 2000, only 32 percent of 
unutilized human capital services are 
attributable to that activity. In per capita 
terms, the amount of UPE accounted for 
by housework began the period at about 
$4,900 per person, but by 2000 this had 
fallen to about $2,700 per person.
The next largest source of UPE comes 
from a quite different source; namely, a 
lack of employment opportunities  
seeking work but being unable to find it. 
This reason for failing to utilize the 
potential services of human capital shows 
the most cyclical sensitivity of all of the 
reasons, as is expected given its close tie 
to the macroeconomic performance of the 
economy. The aggregate value of human 
capital services lost to the U.S. economy
because of a lack of employment 
opportunities ranged from around $150 
billion per year in 1978 (3 percent of 
GDP) and 2000 (1.5 percent of GDP) to 
about $350 billion per year during the 
recessions of the early 1980s (6.3 percent 
of GDP) and the early 1990s (4.3 percent 
of GDP). At the depth of those recessions, 
about 70 percent as much EC was 
unutilized because of unemployment as 
because of housework. In per capita 
terms, the value of unutilized EC due to a 
lack of jobs ranged from a high of $2,700 
per working-age person in 1982 to a low 
of about $1,000 per person in 2000.
Illness or disabling health conditions 
form the third most important reason for 
human capital underutilization, and 
accounted for a per capita value of about 
$1,300 to $1,400 per year until the early 
1990s. Beginning in 1992, the per capita 
loss of earnings attributable to illness or 
disability began a steady increase, 
reaching about $1,850 by 2000. This 
increase is unexpected and unexplained. 
However, even during the 1980s, some 
early warnings regarding a growing 
incidence of illness/disability problems 
among the working-age population were 
reported in the literature. By 2000 about 
$300 billion of earnings were lost 
annually due to this factor, accounting for 
21 percent of total unrealized EC.
Providing Policy-Relevant Information
In addition to revealing these long- 
term demographic and labor market 
patterns, estimates of the level of EC and 
its utilization also provide insights that 
are directly related to public policy
concerns. For example, one of the most 
prominent national social policy issues  
concern with the costs and consequences 
of welfare programs aimed at young, low- 
education single mothers resulted in the 
Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA). This legislation sought to 
carry out the pledge of both Congress and 
the president to substitute work for 
welfare for these women. Increases in the 
generosity of work related subsidies, such 
as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
were designed to assist in this effort. The 
exit from market work of older people of 
working age, primarily males, is also of 
concern to economists and policymakers. 
The loss of skills, experience, and 
productivity to the nation's production 
process that is implied by this exit is seen 
as inhibiting economic growth and 
macroeconomic performance. Many see 
this exodus as reflecting the rational 
choices of older workers who can either 
continue to work and receive wages, or 
retire on public and private pension 
income. Viewed in this context, reducing 
retirement benefits, increasing minimum 
retirement ages, and reducing access to 
disability benefits have often been 
proposed as means to halt this exodus. 
However, prior to undertaking such 
measures, policymakers need to fully 
understand the extent of this exit, and 
whether this pattern is attributable to the 
incentives in these public programs. Our 
analysis of EC and its utilization reveals 
detailed patterns for various groups and 
enhances our understanding of these 
policy-relevant developments.
Robert H. Haveman is the John Bascom Professor in 
the Department of Economics and the LaFollette 
School of Public Affairs at the University of Wiscon 
sin at Madison. Andrew Bershadker is an economist 
in the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Tax 
Analysis. Jonathan A. Schwabish is a doctoral stu 
dent in economics at the Center for Policy Research 
at Syracuse University.
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Wayne Vroman, Jeffrey B. Wenger, 
and Stephen A. Woodbury
Efarly predictions that the current 
recession would be short-lived now 
appear to have been overly optimistic. 
Labor markets recovered slowly 
following the recession of the early 
1990s, and this recession shows signs of a 
similar pattern. Since September 2002, 
over 41 percent of Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) recipients have been 
exhausting their regular UI benefits, an 
all-time high. Also, in the last year, more 
than 20 percent of the unemployed have 
been jobless for longer than 26 weeks, the 
first time this has occurred since 1994.
The problem of long-term 
unemployment is serious at all times but 
typically gains attention only during 
recessions. Here, we discuss the ability of 
the UI system to address long-term 
unemployment.
Unemployment Insurance can be 
viewed as a three-tiered program. The 
"regular" benefits that are financed and 
administered by each state constitute the 
program's first tier. The second tier of the 
UI system is the permanent or "standby" 
extended benefit program (standby EB), 
which Congress established in 1970. The 
standby EB program is intended to 
activate automatically when 
unemployment rises, extending the 
potential duration of a worker's benefits 
by 50 percent (up to 13 weeks). The third 
tier of the UI system is made up of the 
"emergency" benefit extensions that 
Congress has enacted in every recession 
since 1958. These emergency extensions 
have varied greatly in their generosity, 
financing, and eligibility criteria.
How Extended Benefits Work
Standby EB, the second tier of the UI 
system, is a permanent extended benefits
program that is intended to activate 
automatically in a recession rather than 
requiring congressional discretion and 
action and is financed half-and-half by 
the states and the federal government. 
(Regular UI benefits are financed out of 
state UI trust funds, whereas most 
emergency extended benefits have been 
financed out of the federal UI trust fund.) 
Weekly benefits under standby EB are the 
same as weekly benefits under the regular 
state program.
Originally, standby EB was activated 
in a given state whenever the state's 13- 
week average insured unemployment rate 
(IUR) reached 4 percent and was at least 
20 percent higher than its average in the 
same period of the previous two years 
(see Table 1, which summarizes this and 
subsequent extended benefit triggers). 
Also, it was activated nationally whenever 
the 13-week average of the national IUR 
reached 4 percent. However, in 1980 and 
1981, Congress enacted three changes 
that made it more difficult for the standby 
EB program to activate the IUR needed 
to activate EB on a state-specific basis 
was increased from 4 percent to 5 percent, 
the trigger that had activated EB 
nationally was eliminated, and the 
definition of insured unemployment was 
revised so as to omit EB claimants from 
the calculation, reducing the IUR in times 
when EB was activated. 1
In addition to the standard IUR trigger, 
states currently have the option of 
choosing either of two alternative EB 
triggers. Under the first, which has been 
available since 1981, EB activates when a 
state's IUR reaches 6 percent. Under this 
IUR trigger, the IUR need not exceed its 
level in earlier years for EB to trigger. 
Under the second alternative trigger,
which has been available since 1992, EB 
activates when a state's total 
unemployment rate (TUR) reaches 6.5 
percent and is at least 10 percent higher 
than in either of the two previous years. 
(The TUR is based on the Current 
Population Survey and published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In contrast, the 
IUR is based entirely on UI program 
data.)
Unlike standby EB, emergency benefit 
extensions are enacted by Congress on an 
ad hoc basis rather than being triggered 
automatically. There have been seven 
such extensions, from the Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1958 through the Temporary Extended 
Unemployment Compensation of 2002 
(TEUC), which was enacted and became 
effective in March 2002, when it became 
evident that the labor market would not 
recover quickly following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.2 The 
program has extended exhaustees' 
benefits in all states by 50 percent of their 
regular benefit duration, up to 13 weeks. 
It also has provided up to an additional 13 
weeks of benefits in states where standby 
EB had triggered on or the IUR was at 
least 4 percent and at least 20 percent 
higher than its average in the same period 
of the previous two years. A total of 12 
states paid these additional benefits under 
TEUC at some point, although by 
December 2002, only three (Alaska, 
Oregon, and Washington) were doing so. 
The program is financed entirely from the 
federal Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Account (EUCA).
The original TEUC program expired at 
the end of 2002, but Congress extended it 
at the beginning of 2003. As a result, 
workers with remaining TEUC balances 
at the end of 2002 could continue to draw 
emergency extended benefits. Also, new 
exhaustees of regular benefits can claim 
TEUC through the last week of May 2003 
and can draw TEUC benefits through the 
end of August 2003. However, the TEUC 
extension did not provide additional 
benefits to workers who exhausted their 
TEUC benefits.
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Table 1 Triggers Used to Activate Standby Extended Benefits and TEUC
Trigger Description When in effect
4% IUR with 20% 
increase
5% IUR with 20% 
increase
4.5% national IUR 
5% IUR 
6% IUR
6.5% TUR with 
10% increase
State IUR of at least 4%. Also, IUR must 
be at least 20% higher than its average in 
the same period of the previous two years.
State IUR of at least 4%; must be at least 
20% higher than its average in same 
period of the previous two years.
National IUR of at least 4.5% (no increase 
specified)
State IUR of at least 5% (no increase 
specified)
State IUR of at least 6% (no increase 
specified)
State TUR of at least 6.5%; must also be at 
least 10% higher than in the same period 
of one of the previous two years.
EB, 8/70 to 8/81 
TEUC, 3/02 to 5/03
EB, 8/81 to present
EB, 8/70 to 8/81
EB, 1976 to 8/81
(state option)
EB, 8/81 to present
(state option)
EB, 6/92 to present
(state option)
NOTE: IUR is the insured unemployment rate; TUR is the total unemployment rate; EB is the 
standby extended benefits program; TEUC is the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compen 
sation program that came into effect in March 2002 and is scheduled to expire in May 2003.
Trends in Extended Benefits Payments
In the recessions of the mid 1970s and 
the early 1980s, the standby EB program 
was a significant source of benefits for 
unemployed workers, as shown in 
Figure 1. However, standby EB has 
activated rarely since 1981 and was a 
negligible source of benefits during both 
the recession of the early 1990s and the 
current recession.
In a mechanical sense, the reasons for 
the demise of the standby EB program are 
clear. First, as mentioned above, Congress 
revised the triggers in 1981 so as to make 
it more difficult for EB to activate. This 
policy choice was based on the belief that 
the existing triggers resulted in an EB 
program with work disincentive effects 
that were unacceptably high. Second, 
insured unemployment rates, which are 
used to trigger EB, have shown a 
downward trend over the last two decades 
(Vroman 2002). Even if the triggers had 
not been revised in 1981, the standby EB 
program would have activated less 
frequently in the past 20 years than before. 
Simulations we have run suggest that, 
under the original standby EB trigger (4 
percent IUR with a 20 percent increase), 
EB would have activated in only 11 states 
during 2001-2002, covering even fewer 
unemployed workers and UI exhaustees 
than it did during the recession of the early
1990s (Woodbury and Vroman 2003; 
Walters and Wenger 2003).
However, the demise of standby EB 
has two underlying causes. First, labor 
markets have been stronger since 1985 
than they were between 1970 and 1985. 
Second, the financing of standby EB is 
shared by the states and the federal 
government, whereas emergency 
extensions have been federally funded. 
With Congress willing to pass emergency 
extensions, the states have not pressured 
Congress to revise the standby EB 
triggers so that the program activates 
more frequently. Indeed, during 2002 
governors could, and did, terminate 
standby EB in states where it had 
triggered on as soon as the current 
emergency extension (TEUC) passed. 
This shifted the financing of extended 
benefits from the states to the federal 
government.
One could possibly argue that the 
demise of the standby EB program is an 
appropriate outcome if unemployment 
has fallen secularly, then the demand for 
unemployment insurance would also fall. 
However, Congress has continued to pass 
emergency benefit extensions in each 
recession, essentially ignoring the 
downward trend in the unemployment 
rate and gauging the need for extended 
benefits with an eye to the median
duration of unemployment and the UI 
exhaustion rate, both of which have 
trended up over time.3 As Figure 1 shows, 
the demise of standby EB has been 
accompanied by the rise of emergency 
federal UI extensions.
Policy Alternatives
Two obvious policy options exist for 
addressing long-term unemployment. The 
first is to expand and/or extend the current 
emergency extension (TEUC), which 
provides 13 weeks of extended benefits in 
most states and is set to expire in May 
2003. As yet, there is little evidence of 
improvement in the labor market, and 
roughly half of all TEUC recipients have 
exhausted their emergency benefits. This 
suggests that Congress should consider 
expanding TEUC to provide an additional 
10 to 13 weeks of benefits to workers who 
have exhausted their TEUC benefits. It 
also suggests that an extension of the 
existing TEUC program through the end 
of 2003 may well be needed.
A second option is to revive the 
standby EB program and make it a 
significant source of extended benefits 
during recessions. This option would 
require a rethinking of both the financing 
and the triggering of standby EB. How to 
finance extended benefits whether 
federally or by the states has been a 
source of contention for decades 
(Blaustein 1993). However, the shared 
state-federal financing of standby EB has 
been the downfall of standby EB, and 
Congress has been willing repeatedly to 
finance emergency extensions federally. It 
is time for Congress to acknowledge that 
the financing of benefits beyond 26 weeks 
is a federal responsibility and to make the 
standby EB program federally funded.
Reviving standby EB would also 
require Congress to lower the IUR trigger, 
lower the alternative TUR trigger and 
make it mandatory rather than optional, or 
adopt a new EB trigger, such as the UI 
exhaustion rate. The automatic triggering 
of standby EB has three advantages over 
emergency extensions. First, emergency 
extensions are subject to a "recognition 
lag" it takes time for Congress to 
recognize the onset of a recession and to 
enact legislation, so there may be a long
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lag between the onset of slack labor 
markets and the availability of extended 
benefits. Second, emergency extensions 
have been politically difficult to shut 
down; as a result, they may continue to 
pay extended benefits beyond the time 
when labor markets have recovered and 
when workers can reasonably be expected 
to find reemployment. Third, emergency 
extensions have usually been made 
effective on the date of enactment, 
leaving UI administrators little or no time 
to implement the new program. For all 
these reasons, emergency extensions are 
likely to be less efficient than automatic 
extensions.
In January 2003, a third possible 
option was proposed: the Bush 
Administration's Personal Reemployment 
Accounts (PRAs). The PRA proposal has 
three main features. First, certain UI 
claimants would be identified as "likely to 
exhaust" their regular benefits. Second, 
for these claimants, an account of up to 
$3,000 would be established to buy 
intensive reemployment services, 
training, and other services like 
transportation or child care, at the 
claimant's discretion. Third, if the 
claimant returns to work within 13 weeks 
of receiving the first UI payment, he or 
she would keep whatever balance 
remained in the PRA. This last feature
creates an incentive for rapid 
reemployment and gives PRAs the flavor 
of a reemployment bonus, which has been 
extensively studied in randomized trials 
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001).
The size of the worker-managed 
account $3,000 suggests that the PRA 
is being put forward as an alternative to a 
further extension of TEUC (13 weeks at 
the national average weekly benefit 
amount of $230 is roughly $3,000). 
However, eligibility for PRAs would be 
restricted to about 12 percent of new UI 
recipients (President's Council of 
Economic Advisers 2003), while UI 
exhaustion rates are currently in excess of 
40 percent. Whatever the merits of PRAs 
as a reemployment policy for workers who 
are likely to benefit from reemployment 
assistance and training when labor 
markets are tight, PRAs cannot be viewed 
as a substitute for extended benefits when 
labor markets are slack.
Long-term unemployment is a problem 
that is generally neglected until it 
becomes acute, as it does in recessions. 
The PRA is a proposal that has the 
potential to help long-term unemployed 
workers throughout the business cycle and 
to shorten their unemployment spells. 
However, it should not be confused with 
short-term measures like benefit
extensions, which workers will rely on 
until the labor market recovers.
Notes
1. In addition, more stringent eligibility and dis 
qualifying conditions were imposed on EB claim 
ants. These changes were part of a broader effort by 
the then-new Reagan administration and Congress 
to reduce expenditures on domestic programs.
2. For a summary of the emergency extensions 
up to TEUC, see Woodbury and Rubin (1997).
3. The UI exhaustion rate peaked at 38.2 percent 
in 1975, 40.8 percent in 1983, 40.1 percent in 1993, 
and 42.7 percent in 2002.
Wayne Vroman is a senior economist at the Urban 
Institute, Washington, DC. Jeffrey B. Wenger is an 
economist at the Economic Policy Institute, Wash 
ington, DC. Stephen A. Woodbury is a professor of 
economics at Michigan State University and a 
senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute
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develop an indicator of the value of the 
human capital stock held by the 
nation's working-age population called 
earnings capacity (EC), and use it to 
study the time trends in aggregate 
human capital in the United States and 
human capital per worker. They also 
use EC to evaluate utilization of the 
nation's human capital stock, thereby 
demonstrating the usefulness of the EC 
indicator in measuring the size and 
strength of the U.S. economy.
The authors then explore these 
patterns for the entire working-age 
population as well as for at-risk 
subgroups distinguished by race, 
schooling, and age in order to highlight 
the social and public policy relevance 
of the EC indicator. Overall, their 
empirical results provide insights into 
the performance of the U.S. economy 
over the past three decades, and they 
serve to supplement other analyses of 
this performance.
229 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-256-5 
$17 paper ISBN 0-88099-255-7 / 2003.
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focuses on the 
labor market 
implications and 






analysis of the current labor market 
experience of American workers with 
disabilities and an assessment of the 
impact the ADA has had on that 
experience. Whereas previous studies 
focused on a single dimension of this 
experience (e.g., wages or employment 
levels) evaluated at a single point in 
time, or focused on the labor supply 
impact of disability policies, this 
research explores the labor market 
experience across those dimensions 
and across time. The result is a more 
complete picture of what Americans 
with disabilities can expect as 
participants in the labor market and of 
whether this experience has been 
impacted by the passage of the ADA. 
The chapters in this book address 
such topics as employment outcomes 
among the disabled, wages earned by 
the disabled and nondisabled, job 
quality issues, job separation and 
unemployment experiences of the 
disabled, the impact of state-level 
legislation on wages, employment, and 
hours of disabled workers in different 
states.
229 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-252-2 





Evidence from Three 
Experiments
Philip K. Robins













whether or not 
offers of financial 
bonuses 
persuaded 
recipients of unemployment insurance 
to return to work sooner. A number of 
experimental designs were tried and 
some clear results were seen. While 
policymakers so far have chosen not to 
implement such bonus offers, the issue 
of how to increase active job search 
among UI recipients remains an issues, 
and bonus offers constitute one of only 
a handful of options at their disposal 
that might achieve that goal.
In this new volume, a select group 
of UI researchers describes the 
motivation for and the design, 
implementation, and impacts of UI 
bonus experiments administered in 
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington. They also describe the 
benefits and costs of the various 
experimental treatments for the 
government as a whole, the UI system 
in particular, the claimants' earnings, 
and the overall net benefits to society.
Contributors include Robert G. 
Spiegelman, Walter A. Corson, Paul T. 
Decker, Christopher J. O'Leary, 
Stephen A. Woodbury, Carl Davidson, 
and Philip K. Robins.
296 pp. $44 cloth ISBN 0-88099-226-3 
$25 paper ISBN 0-88099-225-5 / 2001.
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